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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: To develop a better understanding of the personal readiness of Emergency 
Department (ED) staff and senior nursing students with regard to managing a potential 
bioterrorism incident. 
Methods: A cross-sectional descriptive survey using the Bioterrorism Assessment Tool 
was conducted to examine the factors influencing the knowledge pertaining to the health 
care management of victims of bioterrorism amongst ED clinicians. 
Findings: Universally a low level of awareness and knowledge was found in all groups. 
Only one knowledge-influencing factor was found. The factor, internal awareness, 
comprised of the participant self-report on personal and ED preparedness for a 
bioterrorism attack entered into the model with a R2 of .062. 
Conclusion: The sample was not prepared to deal with bioterrorism. This lack of 
preparedness is impacted upon by the lack of awareness and knowledge ED clinicians 
have with respect to bioterrorism casualty management. 
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Infectious diseases have killed people for as long as humankind can remember. In 
the eleventh century, before the Common Era (BCE), man first recorded his dealings with 
the plague in the area around Ashdod, Israel (Scully & Kohn, 2007). The pestilence 
continued for many years until 400 BCE, when Scythian archers changed the course of 
history by first using bacteria as a means of killing their enemies. They figured out that 
by dipping their arrows in manure or decomposed bodies, the enemy would die more 
viciously and in greater numbers. Since then, man has placed dead bodies in the drinking 
water of his enemies; catapulted bubonic plague infected corpses over the walls of enemy 
cities; and passed smallpox, plague, and yellow fever laced clothing to his enemies as 
gifts with the intention of killing them (Smart, 1997). 
The roots of terrorism are not clear, largely due to the fact that there is no 
universal legal definition of terrorism or terrorist (Golder & Williams, 2004; Record, 
2003). It is clear however that terrorism came about much later than infectious diseases, 
around the late eighteenth century, with much attention brought to the subject since the 
1970's (Halliday, 2001). Although governments have bantered about with the proposed 
or actual use of biological agents in warfare, the concept of using biological agents as a 
tool of terrorism against civilian populations is relatively recent. In 1972, the first 
stockpile of a biological agent (typhoid) was found in the possession of a Chicago based 
terrorist organization known as the Order of the Rising Sun. Their intention was to create 
a new master race by contaminating the water supplies of various cities (Andersen, 2003; 
Paquette, 2004). 
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Significance of the Problem 
The trend of finding people and terrorist organizations that threaten to use 
biological agents has continued since the first discovery of 1972. In 1984, the first actual 
use of a biological agent {Salmonella typhimurium) on North American soil went largely 
unnoticed, despite the fact that it caused 751 casualties. The incident caused no worry or 
panic in the North American health care community, largely because discovery of the 
incident was untimely, novel, and classified by the government (Miller, Engelberg, & 
Broad, 2001). This aforementioned incident was a clear demonstration that the problem 
of biological terrorism was upon our society but no one noticed its significance or cared 
to admit it due to the grandiosity of mitigating the situation should an attack occur 
domestically. The failure to recognize that the threat was real continued despite numerous 
expert reports on the subject (Hamburg, 1999; Henderson, 1998; Kortepeter & Parker, 
1999; Purver, 1995; United States General Accounting Office [GAO], 2001). However, 
the attitude toward the threat of biological terrorism changed on the 4th of October 2001 
following the American anthrax mail attacks. Such a change in attitude toward the threat 
of biological terrorism happened largely because the world was already at a heightened 
state of alert following the 11th of September 2001 attacks by Al-Qaeda on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. The anthrax attacks that were launched through mailing 
of envelopes contaminated with white powder lead to the victimization of 22 people and 
exposed the lack of preparedness in both the health care community and various levels of 
government. As a result, health care and government agencies were forced to take a 
closer look at the likelihood of future biological attacks, the state of preparedness to deal 
with such attacks, and identify the key stakeholders who would deal with future attacks. 
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The assessment quickly revealed that the system was not ready to deal with the threat of 
another biological terrorist attack. 
Following the anthrax attacks, government agencies appeared to be dealing with 
the potential of a biological terrorist attack more seriously. In fact, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released a list of potential biological agents that 
terrorist organizations might use (Rotz, Khan, Lillibridge, Ostroff, & Hughes, 2002). The 
American intelligence community also released reports pressing that the threat of another 
biological terrorism event was impending (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Cronin, 2003; United 
States Central Intelligence Agency, 2003). However, despite these reports and the 
heightened awareness of the potential of an attack, the ability to predict such attacks 
remains an enormous task, if not an impossible one (Dembek, 2005). This is because an 
attack can be launched at any scale and in various forms such as aerosol attacks (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2000), postal mail attacks (Paquette, 2004), and/or 
contamination of the food and water supply (Khan, Swerdlow, & Juranek, 2001). It is 
also possible that terrorists could launch attacks using conventional explosives targeting 
industrial, medical, and academic biological research facilities. Rail or land shipments of 
biological materials also pose a potential target for the terrorist attempting to release 
biological agents into the environment (Emergency Preparedness Canada, 1995). 
In addition to the national security concerns over the potential of a bioterrorist 
attack, the threat of such attacks poses an immense challenge to our health care system. 
Thus, it is important that we be prepared to manage any bioterrorism scenario that may be 
launched without a previous warning and that could affect a large portion of the 
population. Any preparation undertaken needs to include public health epidemiological 
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surveillance and training of health care personnel to safeguard themselves and the public. 
It should also include a wide range of procedures and policies that would be initiated in 
the event of an attack to limit the spread of infectious diseases within hospital settings, 
effectively diagnose and treat the seldom seen diseases, administratively and logistically 
prepare for management of large numbers of casualties, manage the mental health 
sequelae that will likely follow an event, provide health information to the public at large, 
and manage the mortuary issues surrounding the recently contaminated deceased 
(Johnson-Winegar et al. 2005). 
Despite the impact that a bioterrorist attack may have on the health care system 
and the society at large, it is apparent the health care community currently has significant 
gaps related to preparedness. This is largely because it is not clear if nurses and 
physicians in Canadian emergency departments (EDs) have enough training pertaining to 
the management of victims of bioterrorism. It is also not clear if they perceive the threat 
of a biological attack to be real. In addition, such an attack is likely to catch clinicians by 
surprise due to the inability to detect a covert release of biological agents. The impact of 
a bioterrorism attack will be substantial as the Canadian population is immunologically 
vulnerable due to the current lack of licensed vaccines against common biological 
terrorism agents (Johnson-Winegar et al., 2005). The current state of laboratory 
diagnostic capabilities in most hospitals will not support a timely diagnosis of rare and 
seldom-encountered biological agents furthering the lack of readiness the health care 
system has to deal with the threat. In fact, even when presenting conditions are finally 
diagnosed, we are likely to experience lack of therapeutic agents to treat a potentially 
overwhelming number of patients (Johnson-Winegar et al., 2005). 
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Given that ED staff is the frontline of the health care system in the case of a large-
scale bioterrorist attack, it is particularly important that they be well prepared to deal with 
such a potential. In the event of an overt attack, they will need to be able to deal with 
victims contaminated with contagious agents and the psychological consequences that 
result from the attack. If not prepared, clinicians may not be able to identify the actual 
presence or type of biological agent in a timely manner and thus may endanger their own 
health when they come in unprotected contact with victims. No matter what happens, ED 
personnel need to be able to methodically decontaminate victims in order to render them 
safe to enter the ED and prevent gross infrastructure contamination; effectively care for, 
diagnose, and initiate treatment for a possible massing of patients; and even care for 
concurrent traumatic blast injuries if an explosive device was used to disseminate the 
biological agent. In addition, ED personnel are expected to manage the victims of a 
biological terrorist act, while continuing to care for their regular ED patients that they 
face on a daily basis (NATO, 1996). All these responsibilities highlight the importance of 
providing ED clinicians with all the tools at our disposal to make sure that they are well 
prepared to manage a bioterrorism emergency. They also highlight the importance of 
ensuring that proper policy and procedures are put in place in all emergency departments 
so that the response to such attacks be well coordinated and thought through. 
Purpose of the Study 
The general purpose of this study was to develop a better understanding of the 
personal readiness of ED staff and senior nursing students with regard to dealing with and 
managing a potential biological terrorist act. Specifically, the study explored: (a) the 
training that health care providers who work in the ED (that is, nurses, physicians, and 
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senior nursing students) have received with regard to the management of victims of 
biological terrorism, (b) the current level of threat awareness and knowledge that these 
health care providers possess with regard to the issue of biological terrorism, and (c) the 
factors associated with the knowledge that ED health care providers have concerning the 
management of victims of biological terrorism. 
Relevance to Nursing 
The disaster cycle represents the course of a disaster from start to finish, including 
the prevention of disaster, preparation for disaster, the experience of the actual disaster 
event, the response to the disaster, and the recovery from the disaster (Ciottone, 2006). It 
provides a tool for the examination of the various features of disaster planning and 
response, and thus is useful to registered nurses who play a significant role in the 
planning and management of responses to disasters (Klein 2000; Langan, 2005; 
Veenema, 2007a). One common responsibility that is often delegated to nurse 
administrators is the writing of policy and procedures pertaining to the disaster 
managements plan (Veenema, 2007a). In addition, nurse educators working the ED and 
nurses academics are expected to teach nurses and other staff members about the proper 
response to a disaster. This responsibility includes teaching about personal preparedness 
skills such as N95 / N100 protective mask fitting, clinical management of the mass 
casualties produced by a disaster, and coordinating disaster drills. Furthermore, nursing 
academics are expected to carry out the responsibility of including the theoretical aspects 
of disaster planning and management in university nursing programs (Stanley & 
Veenema, 2007). Finally, emergency nurses, especially advanced practice emergency 
nurses, have an important role and responsibility to conduct research related to disaster 
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nursing (Canadian Nurses Association, 2002; Cole, 2000; Ricciardi, Griffin-Agazio, 
Lavin, & Walker, 2007). 
Preparing for a biological terrorist attack is one important subset of the overall set 
of skills of disaster planning in emergency nursing. By having a good understanding of 
the factors that influence the knowledge possessed by emergency nurses with regard to 
managing victims of bioterrorism, we can better prepare them to deal with potential 
attacks. Our ability to assess who amongst health care providers is knowledgeable in the 
management of victims of biological terrorist acts is key to effective planning for 
management of the consequences of an attack, educating nursing and other health care 
providers, and conducting further research. 
This study has a special significance to nurses working within the federal and 
provincial governments as disaster planners. Occasionally, Canada hosts a wide variety 
of important national and international events such as the G8 Summit, the Olympic 
Games, the Summit of the Francophone Countries, and World Trade Organization 
meetings. Such gatherings present high value targets for terrorists wishing to advance 
their agenda by inflicting mass casualties. Thus, by having a tool to assess the local 
emergency preparedness with respect to biological terrorism they can identify the 
shortfalls in local ED clinician knowledge prior to the event. This in turn can result in 
targeted training initiatives, federal resource tasking, and financial allocation targeted at 
the identified vulnerabilities. These actions are critical to the processes of an effective 
disaster preparedness program (Keim & Giannone, 2006). 
The significance of this topic and research to emergency nurses is immense. 
Nurses provide nursing care for individuals, families, and groups in various environments 
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with the goal being to promote or preserve health (Fawcett, 1996). The emergency nurse 
has an onus to provide the best possible care for clients and take action in a situation 
where the client's well-being is threatened (College of Nurses of Ontario, 2002). This 
includes the unfortunate client who arrives in the ED after exposure to the effects of 
biological terrorism. Without proper situational awareness and training, victims of a 
bioterrorism event will needlessly die, and nurses themselves may become casualties. 
Conceptual Framework 
The Canadian Forces (CF) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence 
Framework was born out of the CF NBC defence strategic doctrine. It provides a 
theoretical framework when preparing for operations in a NBC contaminated 
environment (Ministry of National Defence [MND], 2005a). It is a tool for preparedness 
and response that is congruent with Canadian national security policy, international 
treaties, conventions, agreements to which Canada is a partner, command strategic 
guidance, NBC weapons policies, counterterrorism policy, nuclear regulation and control 
policy, CF industrial safety policy, and the considerations surrounding toxic industrial 
materials (MND, 2005b; Privy Council Office, 2004). Although the use of this 
framework is almost exclusively limited to the Ministry of National Defence, it has 
applications outside the military context. Parts of the publication series of the framework 
are dedicated to NBC defence during domestic operations and operational cooperation 
with civilian agencies. However, although unused by civilian health planners, largely due 
to its inaccessibility, it is appropriate for civilian use because of its strong substantive 
foundations, structural integrity, and functional adequacy (Smith, 2003). This framework 
relies on four core NBC defence principles, all equally important, which are enabled by 
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five components (MND, 2005a). Figure 1 displays a model describing the relationships 
amongst the four core concepts and the five components of the framework. 
The Principle Concepts 
Force preparation is the first concept and refers to the fact that all organizations 
within the CF need to be prepared for a NBC event. This includes having plans, 
equipment, procedures, organization, and training related to NBC defence. These are seen 
as preliminary measures that are taken prior to exposure to a NBC event. Not only does 
force preparation make the organization ready to operate in a NBC environment, it also 
serves as a deterrent to potential enemies (MND, 2005a; United States Army, 2001). This 
concept has existing parallels in civilian health care. Preparing for disasters through 
planning, acquiring equipment, and training is not a new concept for emergency health 





















Figure 1. The CF Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence Framework (MND, 2005a) 
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Risk management is the second concept and it allows commanders and planners to 
focus on only the real risks that they may be facing. With an unimaginable number of 
potential NBC scenarios existing, energy needs to be focused on the planning and 
preparation for the most likely threats. This is a dynamic process and is ever evolving as 
adversaries conjure up new tactics and equipment. When risks are anticipated, planned 
for, and recognized, freedom of action is gained (MND, 2005a). The concept of risk 
management in the ED setting is not new and is often employed as a strategy for the 
mitigation of lawsuits due to adverse outcomes that commonly occur in the ED (White et 
al., 2005). Risk management in the ED has been used in scenarios such as preparing for 
violence (Bullard, Strack, & Scharoun, 2002; Knott, Bennett, Rawet, & Taylor, 2005) 
and disaster planning (Levi, Micheaelson, Admi, Bregamn, & Bar-Nahor, 2002). The 
principle of risk management is relevant for ED planners and clinicians when planning 
for the management of biological terrorism. It helps clinicians and planners to understand 
that they need not to be knowledgeable of every possible biological terrorism agent in the 
terrorist's disposal, but rather focus only on those that possess a moderate to high 
likelihood of use against the population. 
Flexibility, integration, and cooperation compose the third principle of the 
framework and make reference to the fact that an adversary has a say in how they attack 
an organization and that this attack might not correspond with contingency plans. One of 
the 10 principles of war, flexibility, allows the commander and her/his staff latitude in 
preparing for and responding to an NBC event (MND, 2003; United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defence, 2002). Integration and cooperation with other stakeholders in NBC defence 
ensures a comprehensive interagency strategy against the threat (MND, 2005a). 
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Sustainability is the fourth concept and accounts for the increased burden in terms 
of personnel and supplies that will be consumed over the period of time following an 
NBC event (MND, 2005a). This is important because once an NBC event has occurred 
the management of the event will take place over an unknown and prolonged period of 
time. Once again, this concept is an important concept for ED managers, and disaster 
planners with respect to a biological terrorism event. 
The Enablers 
Five enablers (found in italics below) allow the aforementioned four framework 
principles to be attained. Within the military, they provide for activities and tasks such as 
planning, training, knowledge conveyance, personnel allocation, and funding. Without 
focusing on the enablers, the principles would be large concepts that are too abstract to 
manage in any practical sense. 
Detection, identification, and monitoring allow the targeted organization the 
ability to realize that a covert NBC attack is occurring. Concurrently, it allows the 
biological agents deployed against the organization to be identified, the areas of 
contamination to be delineated and monitored for any changes due to weathering of the 
agents or the spread of contamination through natural or accidental causes (MND, 
2005a). The equipment involved is often technologically complex, expensive, and is 
seldom used outside of the military and hazardous materials detection team setting 
(MND, 2005c). Although detection and identification technology have a clear use in the 
detection and monitoring of potentially contaminated patients, and the testing of patients 
after decontamination for confirmation of cleanliness, it is inappropriate to apply this 
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concept to the civilian ED setting until the technology to carry out this enabler is widely 
available. 
Communication and information systems enable the organization affected by a 
NBC attack to rapidly collect, evaluate, and disseminate information regarding the NBC 
event (MND, 2005a). With the large volume of information required to manage a 
biological terrorism event, the infrequency of the use of this information, and the speed in 
which this information is required, this concept is relevant to ED staff. 
The concept of personal protection from infectious diseases is not new in the ED, 
and is commonly found as part of the departmental infection control policy (Wilson, 
2006). It allows personnel who must operate in a NBC contaminated environment the 
freedom to do so without the fear of illness or death. It encompasses activities such as the 
selection and use of individual protective equipment (MND, 2005a). This enabler is 
highly relevant to ED personnel who are faced with a biological terrorism incident. 
Without the ability to protect oneself, health care providers risk physiological and 
psychological harm and increase their chances of becoming casualties. Personal 
protection provides physical and psychological barriers to the toxic environment, thus 
allowing clinicians to retain some control over the presenting situation. 
Hazard management is the process of limiting the impact that NBC agents have 
on the population. This can be accomplished through hazard avoidance, control of hazard 
spread, or decontamination (MND, 2005a). After an overt biological terrorism event, 
emergency departments cannot lock out potential patients thus avoiding the hazard 
altogether. Patients must be cared for inside the department, and hence the hazard must 
be managed. This is accomplished through the decontamination of overt or suspected 
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contamination and the isolation of infectious patients. Klein (2000) has discussed the 
importance of decontamination in the ED setting. The concept of isolating infectious 
patients is also commonly used in health care (Heymann, 2004; Wilson, 2006). 
Medical countermeasures and medical support is an enabler that enhances the 
success of the principle framework concepts. These activities include the medical 
interventions taken in advance to minimize the impact of NBC agent exposure and the 
evacuation and treatment of patients once they have been physiologically or 
psychologically affected by NBC agents (MND, 2005a). 
Use of the Framework 
The CF NBC framework is an all-encompassing model for planning the response 
to a NBC event. It was beyond the scope of this study to utilize the full model of 
preparedness, and hence only parts of the framework that were directly relevant to this 
study were used. With respect to the principal concepts, two of the four concepts were 
utilized. These were the principles of force preparation and risk management. The 
principle of force preparation had unique applications to this study as the study examined 
the preparation of ED staff (that is, training and knowledge) prior to a biological 
terrorism event. This principle when combined with the principle of risk management 
forms an important aspect of the required knowledge that ED staff needs to possess. 
Personal protection and hazard management, in terms of decontamination and isolation, 
are two enablers that were of relevance to this study. In addition, the enabler that includes 
information systems guided exploitation of the knowledge of accessibility that clinicians 
may have for just-in-time information resources. The medical countermeasures enabler 
was examined as a concept for the mandate of treatment after a biological terrorism 
14 
attack. It is an important one for this thesis, and was examined with respect to the social 
and the professional mandate for ED clinicians to provide care after a biological incident. 
Research Questions 
The study provided answers to the following research questions: 
(1) What training do health care providers working in the ED (that is, nurses, physicians, 
and senior nursing students) receive with regard to the treatment and management of 
victims of biological terrorism? 
(2) What is the current level of threat awareness with regard to the issue of biological 
terrorism among health care providers? 
(3) What are the factors associated with the knowledge of health care providers in the 
ED concerning the management of victims of bioterrorism? 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Search Strategy 
The proceeding literature was obtained through a systematic review of seven 
databases: Proquest Nursing Journals, PubMed, Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied 
Health Literature, Medline, Ovid Nursing, Ovid HealthSTAR, and the Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews. Additionally, theses and dissertations stored in the 
Proquest Dissertations and Theses database or Proquest Digital Dissertations database 
were searched. Keywords used in the search process included biological, terrorism, 
bioterrorism, nursing, nurse, physician, student, emergency, room, department, 
preparedness, readiness, planning, knowledge, training, education, threat, and disaster. 
These search terms were used in various combinations with Boolean logic operators. This 
approach yielded 23 published articles and no theses or dissertations. 
Bibliographies of books and reference lists of articles were scanned as part of the 
literature identification process in order to find additional relevant articles or books. A 
suggestion of literature to review was also provided by various experts in the field of 
biological terrorism. This resulted in an additional 22 articles, 27 textbook chapters, and 
nine complete textbooks. The completed literature review process yielded a total of 45 
journal articles, 27 textbook chapters, and nine textbooks. 
The Review 
The Threat of Biological Terrorism 
The literature reveals considerable concern for the possibility that terrorists may 
commit further acts of terrorism using biological means. The threat of biological 
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terrorism could come in many forms, could be executed for many reasons, and could be 
perpetrated by a myriad of subversive parties. As succinctly put by Mr. Parachini, a 
RAND Corporation policy analyst, who said in a testimony before a United States 
congressional subcommittee on terrorism "Given our potential vulnerabilities, it is a 
small wonder that states and terrorists have not used disease more often" (Anthrax 
Attacks, 2001, p.2). 
Since 1972, the Canadian intelligence community has extensively studied the 
potential of biological terrorism occurring on Canadian soil. Government experts in the 
field of intelligence threat assessment have concluded that the risk of a biological terrorist 
attack occurring in Canada is real (Purver, 1995). Terrorists view Canada as an attractive 
target because of its societal freedom, privilege, western world values, influence on the 
political stage, and military operations overseas (Privy Council Office, 2004). Kollek 
(2003) noted that, due to its proximity to the United States of America (USA), Canada 
might be used as an attack staging area and may therefore be at risk for an accidental 
biological agent release. An attack could also be directed at Canadian citizens simply as a 
result of Canada's alliance with the USA (Kollek, 2003). 
The literature also provided insight on the possible presentation of a biological 
terrorist attack. It suggests that the risk of an attack using biological agents is lower than 
that of an attack using conventional explosives (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Artenstein, 
2006). Should biological attacks occur, they would likely be small-scale in nature. Large-
scale attacks are not as probable because of the technical and operational challenges in 
the actual delivery of biological agents (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Artenstein, 2006). 
Nonetheless, it is widely feared in the literature that a modestly well-funded terrorist 
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organization could manufacture or acquire biological agents for dissemination (Inglesby, 
O'Toole et al., 2002; Regis, 1999). In fact, the United States Department of Defense 
undertook a study in which one million dollars was provided to three defence employees 
who possessed technical skills, but who had no knowledge of biological weapons. In less 
than one month, they were able to manufacture a biologic simulant of anthrax (Miller, 
2001). 
The literature widely indicated that biological agents could be disseminated in a 
covert manner, without public awareness of the release, or in an overt manner where the 
population is visibly contaminated with a biological agent (Landesman et al., 2001; 
Paquette, 2004; Rubinson et al., 2005). The most probable means of terrorist biological 
agent dissemination is via airborne release. The technology to facilitate aerosol 
dissemination inside a building, or outside over a large area is currently commercially 
available to the public (Paquette, 2004; Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; World 
Health Organization [WHO], 1970). In an experimental study by Defence Research and 
Development Canada (Kournikakis, Armour, Boulet, Spence, & Parsons, 2001), 
investigators placed an anthrax simulant {Bacillus globigii) in various types of mail 
envelopes and had people open them in a mock office environment equipped with 
modern heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems. When the airborne pattern of 
agent dissemination was measured, the bacteria was detected over a considerable area, 
revealing that even a low technology dissemination method such as spores in an envelope 
can pose a significant health risk. 
The literature identified that contamination of food and water sources are two 
other methods of biological agent delivery. In these scenarios, a terrorist might 
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purposefully add a biological agent into the food chain, or into public water supplies 
(Paquette, 2004; Rotz et al., 2002). The vulnerability of the food chain and water supply 
is largely due to the lack of physical protection afforded through public security 
initiatives. Additionally, a terrorist entity may find these methods of contamination 
favourable due to the ease of attack, the large geographic scope of dissemination, and low 
probably of detection by the authorities until illness presents (Paquette, 2004). 
It has been implicated that adversaries of the western world have the desire to use 
biological agents against a civilian population. Three creditable examples were found in 
the literature. These include the state that wants to attack another state by means of a 
clandestine act, the state that provides biological agents to a sub-national terrorist group 
to conduct an attack in order to maintain deniability, or the terrorist group which 
produces a biological agent without the aid of a state (Anthrax Attacks, 2001). In 1991, 
after the first war in Iraq, team members of a United Nations Special Commission found 
evidence that Iraq had conducted research on anthrax, botulism toxin, and Clostridium 
perfringens. This evidence was further confirmed in 1995 when United Nations 
inspectors found a total of 19,000 L of Clostridium botulinum toxin, 8,500 L of anthrax, 
and 2,200 L of aflatoxin (Miller, Engelberg et al., 2001; United States Army Institute of 
Infectious Diseases [USAMRIID], 2005; Zilinskas, 1999). Currently, Al-Qaeda presents 
a looming threat with respect to biological terrorism. In 1998, Osama Bin Laden publicly 
declared that the acquisition of unconventional weapons by his followers was a religious 
duty. This threat was followed in 1999 by attempts to acquire biological weapons in both 
Sudan and Afghanistan, and a statement by a senior Bin Laden associate claiming that his 
group has biological weapons. Further, bioterrorism related documents and equipment 
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recovered from Al-Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan showed a level of sophistication that 
was previously unsuspected (Boureston & Mahaffey, 2003; Paquette, 2004; United States 
Department of State, 2002). 
In 1992, Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov (who changed his name to Ken Alibek), a senior 
biological warfare program manager who defected from Russia reported that Russia had 
an active and robust biological warfare program. This included active research into 
genetic engineering, binary biologicals, and the ability to manufacture large amounts of 
biological agents. Although Russia is no longer a substantial threat, its displaced research 
scientists (which once totaled 60,000 scientists) who have moved from the economically 
crippled Russia to many other countries around the world present a real threat. The 
location of these scientists is not completely known, but Libya, Iran, Syria, and North 
Korea are known to have been actively recruiting ex-Russian scientific expertise. There is 
a concern in the literature that we need not be worried only about rogue, expatriate 
Russian scientists and their knowledge, but we should also worry about the possibility 
that they have left Russia with biological cultures including smallpox (Alibek, 1999; 
Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Henderson et al., 1999; Miller et al., 2001; USAMRIID, 2005). 
Currently, between 13 and 17 nations, many of which are economically or politically 
unstable, are reported to have active biological warfare programs (Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 2002). The risk of terrorist acquisition of biological agents 
from these inadequately protected stocks of weapon grade biological agents is higher than 
ever (Paquette, 2004). 
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History of Use and Attempted Use 
The literature provided numerous examples of attempted or actual use of 
biological agents for the purpose of terrorism. The first effective bioterrorism attack was 
carried out in 1984 by members of a religious cult known as the Rajneeshees when 
dissemination of salmonella {Salmonella typhimurium) in Oregon, USA resulted in 751 
cases of salmonellosis. This outbreak was the direct result of the production and 
distribution of the agent at 10 salad bars in order to affect the outcome of a local election 
(Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Garrent, Magruder, & Molgard, 2001; Miller et al., 2001). 
Anthrax {Bacillus anthracis) has been the most effectively used bioterrorist 
weapon on American soil. In 2001, five letters containing anthrax arrived by public post 
to three cities. These anthrax mailings resulted in 22 confirmed cases of anthrax, five 
deaths, and prophylactic antibiotic treatment of 10,000 people (Inglesby, O'Toole et a l , 
2002; Paquette, 2004; USAMRIID, 2005). The strain of anthrax (Ames) used was a 
highly sophisticated, military grade quality that contained a very high microbial density 
of 100 billion to 1 trillion spores per gram (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Inglesby, O'Toole et 
al, 2002). 
Although the successful use of a biological agent by terrorists is limited to the two 
previously described events, many attempts to use biological agents as a tool of terrorism 
have been described in the literature. These include an instance of a terrorist organization 
in Chicago that possessed 30 to 40 kg of typhoid (Andersen, 2003; Paquette, 2004), four 
instances where Ricin was found in the possession of a terrorist (Andersen, 2003, Garrent 
et al., 2001, USAMRIID, 2005), one instance of plague {Yersinia pestis) possession 
(Carse, 1998; Garrent et al., 2001; USAMRIID, 2005), and the attempts of the Japanese 
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cult Aum Shinrikyo to use anthrax, botulism, Q fever and Ebola against the citizens of 
Japan (Kaplan, 2000, Murakami, 1998/2000; Paquette, 2004; USAMRIID, 2005; 
WuDunn, Miller, & Broad, 1998). 
Potential Biological Agents Available for Use 
The United States CDC conducted a landmark public review of biological agents 
that could be employed as tools of terrorism (Rotz et al., 2002). Subsequently, they 
developed critical biological agent categories for public health preparedness using a risk-
matrix analysis process. These categories (A, B, and C) provide a starting point for 
planners attempting to identify potential threat agents. Agents were categorized according 
to a ranking system that examined public health impact in terms of mobility and 
mortality, potential for production and dissemination, communicability, public 
perception, and special preparations required. Category A agents were deemed to have 
the greatest threat of employment and included Variola major (smallpox), Bacillus 
anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Clostridium botulinum (botulism toxin), 
Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Filoviridae (Ebola and Marburg), and Arenaviridae 
(Lassa). Category B agents were the next level on the threat continuum. These agents 
included Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), Brucella species (brucellosis), Burkholderia mallei 
(glanders), Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis), alphaviruses (Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, and western equine encephalitis), Rickettsia 
prowazekii (louse-borne typhus fever), toxins (ricin and staphylococcal enterotoxin B), 
Chlamydiapsittaci (psittacosis), Salmonella species, Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Vibrio 
cholerae, and Cryptosporidium parvum. Finally, category C agents were identified as 
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agents that present an emerging threat. Nipah virus and Hantavirus were listed as the 
only two category C agents (Rotz et al., 2002). 
The literature has also surprisingly identified various other agents not listed by the 
seminal works of the CDC that could be employed in bioterrorism. These include 
influenza (Cheh, 2006; USAMRIID, 2005; Vorobjev et al., 1997), Rickettsia typhi (flea-
borne typhus fever) (Vorobjev et al., 1997), T-2 (trichothecene) mycotoxin (Fung, 2006; 
USAMRIID, 2005), and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus 
(Shepherd, Cunnion, & Shoff, 2006; USAMRIID, 2005). 
Preparedness to Respond to a Bioterrorism Incident 
Professional Mandate 
The literature provided a clear professional mandate for nurses and physicians 
working in the ED setting to provide care after a biological terrorism incident. For the 
nurse with specialty certification in emergency nursing, the Canadian Nurses Association 
(2006) states that an emergency nurse must be able to ensure safety of the environment 
from toxic biological, chemical, or radiological contamination. This includes initiating 
decontamination procedures, providing care for the patient with infectious diseases, and 
initiating isolation precautions when warranted. Although the College of Nurses of 
Ontario (2002) does not specifically address bioterrorism preparedness, their standards of 
practice suggest that registered nurses are responsible for having the knowledge relevant 
to their area of professional practice. The Emergency Nurses Association provides 
emergency nursing certification in the USA. The core emergency nursing competencies 
with respect to disaster planning and management are considerably clearer and better 
stated than the Canadian competencies (Klein, 2000). Specifically, testable core 
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competencies exist in the identification and management of patients, who have been 
exposed to a biological, or toxin agent. Although it made no specific reference to 
biological terrorism management, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Canada (2003) recommends that all emergency medicine physicians be required to have 
expertise in disaster management. Further, no reference in the literature could be found 
for nursing students practicing in ED settings during a disaster. 
DiMaggio, Markenson, Loo, and Redlener (2005) conducted a random survey that 
examined willingness of 1,919 American paramedics to report to work after a variety of 
disaster related events. Despite the clear professional mandate indicated by the study, the 
authors concluded that only 64.8% of paramedics would be willing to report to a limited 
(10 hospitals, 200 patients) smallpox outbreak. This was considerably lower than the 
willingness to respond for events related to a major snow storm (84.1%), fire with 1,000 
smoke inhalation casualties (87.5%), or an explosion with 2,000 casualties (87.7%). 
Surprisingly, the willingness to respond was even higher (74.3%) for a chemical 
terrorism event with 5,000 casualties, or a radiological terrorism event (73.8%) with 500 
casualties than a biological terrorism event. Of the paramedics who indicated a 
willingness to respond to any disaster situation, 83.3% cited a sense of responsibility as 
their reason for doing so, while 69.9% indicated it was part of their professional code of 
ethics. This work provides insight into a potential conflict between professional mandates 
versus willingness to respond. Because these results are not generalizable to the Canadian 
health care system, or to nurses and physicians working in ED settings in Canada, it is not 
known if these groups of health care professionals would respond similarly. 
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Bioterrorism Incident Preparedness 
Chen, Hickner, Fink, Galliher, and Burstin (2002) found that family physicians 
who felt prepared for a natural disaster were four times more likely than other doctors to 
know how to respond to a biological terrorism attack (35% versus 9%, p < .001). 
Although this is an interesting finding, the authors did not explore the factors that lead 
physicians to consider themselves prepared for a disaster. The literature is not clear with 
respect to what constitutes preparedness of ED or which competencies lead to a state of 
preparedness. The lack of clear direction for ED preparedness is likely due to the fact that 
the topic is interdisciplinary in nature (for instance, clinicians, policy makers, engineers, 
public affairs), and complex with respect to the myriad of possible disaster types and the 
impact that the disaster may have upon ED operations (Klein, 2000). It is suggested 
however that for EDs to be prepared for NBC events clinicians must have an awareness 
of the threat of an attack (Beaton, 2002; Chen et al., 2002; Kollek, 2003). It was also 
found that knowledge attained through education is paramount to preparedness (Pavlin, 
1999; Stanley & Veenema, 2007; United States Public Health Service [USPHS], 2004) 
and that ED clinicians should have formal training in disaster preparedness and 
management (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2002; Klein, 2000; Langan, 2005; Stanley & Veenema, 
2007; Veenema, 2007a). 
Biological Terrorism Awareness 
The literature showed that having an awareness of how biological terrorism acts 
may be employed against the population, what biological agents a terrorist could use, and 
how probable the clinician feels an attack may be is fundamental to the concept of 
preparedness for a bioterrorism incident (Ackerman & Moran, 2004; Beaton, 2002; 
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Chang, 2006; Croddy & Ackerman, 2007; Kollek, 2003). Although the importance of 
awareness has been identified for NBC disasters, and appears frequently in anecdotal 
checklists for bioterrorism preparedness, it has not been scientifically studied in ED 
settings with respect to biological terrorism. Only Beaton (2002) explored awareness by 
utilizing a questionnaire that examined potential terrorist biological agents and the 
perception of threat. This study was not limited to the awareness of biological terrorism 
threat, but rather explored the entire range of NBC events. It also utilized an American 
paramedic sample, which may not be generalizable to Canadian ED clinicians as the level 
of training, possible threat awareness, and health care system structure is not congruent 
between the two populations. 
Education and Knowledge about Biological Terrorism 
Understanding the adequacy of knowledge possessed by emergency clinicians is 
of prime importance in preparing for a bioterrorism event (USPHS, 2004). The literature 
was reviewed in an attempt to find studies that examined the relevant content and 
knowledge of nurses and physicians. The literature identified three areas of knowledge as 
important competencies for nurses and physicians to possess. These include the ability to 
decontaminate and isolate patients, and the act of protecting oneself and thus allowing 
safe care to the patient to be rendered. It is generally accepted that education and training 
increases competence and knowledge in the ED (Bracken & Martinez, 2000). However, 
no literature could be found that examined the factors affecting the knowledge that ED 
clinicians possess with respect to health care after a bioterrorism event. 
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Education 
Three studies of interest with respect to education and bioterrorism were found. 
One examined general training levels (Ghilarducci, Pirrallo, & Hegmann, 2000), another 
examined school curricula (Markenson, DiMaggio, & Redlener, 2005), and the third 
evaluated concrete knowledge with respect to physicians and biological terrorism (Chen 
et al., 2002). Ghilarducci et al (2000) examined the training level of ED nursing staff, 
physicians, and security and auxiliary personnel with respect to casualty management in 
patients presenting from a hazardous materials incident. The researchers divided the 
concept of training into two categories: awareness training (at least four hours) and 
operations training (at least eight hours of training). Participants provided information 
pertaining to total number of hours they had with respect to training about bioterrorism. 
Participants were 5,654 nursing staff working in 119 level-one American trauma centers 
and 1,806 physicians working in 117 level-one American trauma centers. The study 
concluded that overall only 36% of the staff had received training, with physicians having 
more awareness training than nursing staff (35.3% versus 23.4%, respectively). The 
findings however suggested that the two groups had approximately the same levels of 
operational level training (physicians 9% versus nursing staff 8.8%). When the readiness 
of each the trauma centre (n - 156) was examined, only 16.7% (n = 26) centres had 10 or 
more operationally trained staff in the ED. Only 28.8% of the participants acknowledged 
having one or more hours of hazardous materials training per annum. These rates are 
congruent with those reported by Chen et al. (2002) who found that only 18% of family 
physicians had received any prior training in bioterrorism preparedness. 
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Markenson et al. (2005) identified the need for education for health professionals 
with respect to how to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 
explosive terrorist incident. The authors suggested that many of the necessary topics that 
are relevant to such terrorist incidents are already part of existing curricula and are taught 
as part of other subjects such as infectious disease, public health, or epidemiology. 
Despite this observation, only one of the 25 American medical schools that were 
examined had a requirement for formal training in bioterrorism. The authors pointed out 
that many medical schools attempt to address this lack of content pertaining to 
bioterrorism with continuing medical education courses. The authors criticized this 
approach to education because continuing education courses are general and do not 
address the clinical role in the ED. In fact, the authors concluded that there is a clear need 
to incorporate terrorism preparedness training to the curricula of professional health 
programs. They proposed core competencies for nursing, dental, and medical schools, as 
well as schools of public health. Of particular interest was a core competency for nurses 
to have level three (application) competency (of six levels [knowledge, comprehension, 
application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation] in the cognitive domain of Bloom's 
Taxonomy) to assist them to identify and understand the epidemiology, route of 
exposure, treatment, and infection control practices for agents that are classified by the 
CDC as category A agents. Physicians were recommended to have only level two 
competency (comprehension) for this same task standard. With respect to category B 
bioterrorism agents, nurses were expected to have level one competency (knowledge), 
while physicians were expected to have level two competency (comprehension). 
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Although an attempt through this review of the literature was made to ascertain the 
existence of bioterrorism education in nursing programs, no information could be found. 
General Knowledge 
Chen et al. (2002) conducted a random survey of 614 family physicians and found 
95% believe a bioterrorist attack in the United States is a real threat. When asked to 
indicate which biological agents they thought were most likely to be used in a biological 
terrorist attack, they gave seven responses. Six of those conformed to the CDC's category 
A agent list (anthrax [cited by 96 % of participants], smallpox [82%], plague [28%], 
botulism [22%], Ebola [16%], and tularemia [11%]). Nerve gas was the seventh agent 
(14%), which reflects confusion over the difference between biological and chemical 
agents. It was reported that family physicians who have received bioterrorism training 
were three times more likely than other physicians (55% versus 20%, p <.001) to report 
that they knew how to respond to a bioterrorist attack. This was one of the few studies 
found with respect to clinician threat perception. It surveyed only family medicine 
physicians in the USA and therefore is not generalizable to other health care providers, 
such as nurses, or to the Canadian health care system. 
Knowledge about Decontamination 
The purpose of decontamination by health care providers is not to lessen the 
damage done to the patient, but to limit the spread of contamination and reduce the 
potential reaerosolization of the biological agent (Burenzvige, 1992; Franz, 1997). It was 
noted as a fundamental component of protection in the hospital setting (Macintyre et al, 
2002; USAMRIID, 2005; USPHS, 2004) and care of casualties thought to have been 
overtly exposed to biological agents. Most biological agents (except mycotoxins) are not 
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dermally active and hence the risk of disease contraction through intact skin is 
inconsequential. All decontamination must occur before the contaminated patient enters 
the ED in order to prevent facility compromise through contamination. No studies could 
be found in the literature that identified the actual knowledge possessed by ED clinicians 
on the topic of decontamination. 
Knowledge about Personal Protection 
The literature provided numerous references suggesting that possession and 
correct use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is paramount to reducing the risk of 
spreading communicable diseases both to staff and other patients in the event of a 
bioterrorism attack (Grow & Rubinson, 2003; Henderson et al, 1999; USPHS, 2004). 
Markenson et al. (2005) suggested that both nurses and physicians should be able to 
demonstrate proficiency in selecting and using PPE in a range of bioterrorism situations 
typical to one's health profession. However, the authors did elaborate further with regard 
to the specific knowledge required. Secor-Turner and O'Boyle (2006) conducted a 
literature search of Ovid-Medline and PubMed with an aim of identifying works that 
examine the psychological impact of disaster work, nurses, and bioterrorism. Their search 
revealed reports suggesting that possessing and understanding the use of PPE is important 
in reducing the psychological implications on heath care staff during and after a 
biological terrorism attack. It was identified that a situation would "feel" less dangerous 
if a person can have a sense of control and that PPE provides this sense of control to 
some undetermined degree. 
Given the variations in PPE requirements based on the biologic agent, there is a 
risk for confusion among health professionals with regard to the selection and use of 
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PPE. Despite the importance that health care professionals be knowledgeable about PPE 
and how to use them, little is known about health care professionals' preparedness for a 
bioterrorist attack as it relates to the use of PPE. In fact, no studies examining the actual 
knowledge of clinicians in the ED with respect to selection and use of PPE could be 
found. 
Knowledge about Isolation 
In addition to PPE, isolation of patients who have been exposed to contagious 
biological agents is a key component of managing a biological terrorism event (Grow & 
Rubinson, 2003; McKinney, Wesley, Sprang, & Troutman, 2005; USAMRIID, 2005; 
USPHS, 2004). Depending on the biological agent of exposure (standard, contact, 
airborne, or droplet), precautions must be maintained (Grow & Rubinson, 2003; 
Henderson et al., 1999; Inglesby, Dennis et al, 2000; USAMRIID, 2005). The 
importance of isolation as a manner of containing infection was underscored in the 
literature with reports from the SARS outbreak. With respect to SARS, 77% of probable 
SARS cases in Canada were the result of in-hospital exposure (Grow & Rubinson, 2003). 
Similarly, the Director General of Health for Taiwan reported that 94% of SARS 
infections in that country were transmitted inside hospitals (McNeil, 2003). Although not 
a prototypical biological terrorism agent (but a potential agent), the SARS experience 
serves as an excellent example of the importance of isolation for an emerging, airborne 
infection. Only one author (Rubinson et al., 2005) noted the importance of ED staff 
correctly utilizing isolation. No studies could be found with regard to knowledge of ED 
clinicians with respect to appropriate isolation measures after a biological terrorism 
incident. 
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Biological Terrorism - Immediate References 
Given the large amount of knowledge required by clinicians for the management 
of biological terrorism incidents, it is important that they be aware of available resources. 
McKinney et al. (2005) stated that detailed just-in-time resources for clinicians are of 
critical importance to frontline workers. Ghilarducci et al. (2000) identified the need to 
have ready reference materials (books) on the subject of chemical accidents or terrorism 
in the ED for use by the staff at the time of a crisis. In the study by Ghilarducci et al. 
(2000) of 156 level one-trauma centers in the United States, they found that 81.4% had at 
least one chemical response reference available. No information was reported on the 
accessibility of biological terrorism treatment references. 
The aforementioned literature reveals that a substantial focus has been paid to the 
actual security threat of bioterrorism and its biological agents. However, no studies were 
found that examined knowledge, awareness, and perception levels of ED clinicians with 
respect to management of a bioterrorist event. Given the importance that ED clinicians be 
well versed in this content area, research is needed to determine the extent of their 
knowledge levels. Such a study is likely to provide a much-needed assessment of ED 
clinicians' knowledge, identify potential knowledge deficits, and make future curricular 
recommendations to overcome these deficits. 
Summary of the Literature Review 
The literature identified the clear possibility and threat of a future biological 
attack on the Canadian population. This was evident in terms of terrorist motivation for 
use, as evidenced by past use or attempted use of biological agents by terrorists and the 
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technical means of executing a biological terrorism attack. A substantial list of possible 
biological agents for which terrorists might opt to use was discovered. 
It is almost universally agreed upon that ED nurses and physicians have a 
professional mandate to be prepared for all disasters, including a biological terrorism 
attack. Gaps exist in the literature as to what is an acceptable level of preparedness or 
what features constitute ED preparedness for a bioterrorism event. It was identified that 
threat awareness and knowledge are fundamental to the concept of preparedness. Large 
gaps exist in the literature with respect to how to evaluate threat awareness, or what 
actual level of threat awareness ED clinicians have with respect to bioterrorism. 
Knowledge was often related to education and training in the literature. No 
bioterrorism knowledge evaluation tool, or the level of knowledge ED clinicians have 
with respect to bioterrorism health care could be found. Although the topics of 
decontamination, isolation procedures, and PPE were frequently identified as core 
knowledge requirements for emergency clinicians, little is known about the current level 
of knowledge that ED clinicians possess with respect to these content areas. 
Public health workers, (Hamburg, 2001; Kerby, et al., 2005; Landesman, et al., 
2001) the prehospital emergency medical services population, (Beaton, 2002; DiMaggio, 
et al., 2005) academic educators teaching health care clinicians, (Markenson, et al., 2005; 
McKinney, et al., 2005) and family physicians (Chen et al, 2002) have been previously 
studied with respect to biological terrorism preparedness. However, there is a dearth of 
literature that examines ED clinician's awareness and knowledge for a bioterrorism 
event, as most previous studies concentrated on a chemical, or a general hazardous 
materials incident. Although important, knowledge, techniques, and preparation for 
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managing a chemical terrorism event, or an industrial chemical accident are considerably 
different than a biological terrorism incident. 
In summary, the literature indicates there is a threat of biological terrorism, and 
emergency clinicians should be able to manage patients resulting from such an incident. 
Literature has been published on what emergency clinicians should know and the skills, 
techniques, and procedures to manage a biological terrorism situation. The clear gap in 
research, which emerged from this literature review, is the actual awareness and 
knowledge that Canadian ED clinicians have with respect to biological terrorism. 
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
A cross-sectional descriptive survey was conducted to examine the factors 
influencing the knowledge pertaining to the health management of victims of biological 
terrorism amongst ED clinicians. The study compared the responses of ED registered 
nurses, physicians, and senior nursing students at a single time interval. 
Setting and Sample 
Study participants were recruited from a faculty of nursing at a Canadian 
university and two Canadian EDs located in the same city. Participants from the 
university were fourth year baccalaureate nursing students, while participants from the 
hospital sites were registered nurses and physicians. Both EDs receive approximately the 
same volume of patients (approximately 55,000 visits per year). A convenience sampling 
technique was utilized to recruit 130 participants from the three research sites. This 
sample size was calculated according to Tabachnick and Fidell's (2001) formula (7V> 50 
+ 8m, where m is the number of independent variables). Thus, with an estimated number 
of 10 independent variables, the sample should consist of 130 participants. This sample 
size is within the limits of Stevens' (2002) rule of thumb that suggests 10 to 15 
participants for each independent variable. Given that only nine variables were included 
in the regression analysis, the sample of 130 participants was more than sufficient. 
Inclusion Criteria 
Eligible participants met the following inclusion criteria: 
1. Be a registered nurse or physician who works full or part time in the ED; or 
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A concrete definition of terrorism or biological terrorism is not universally 
accepted by governments, scholars, or lawyers (Golder & Williams, 2004; Record, 2003). 
However, terrorism has been conceptually defined as the unofficial (not sanctioned by a 
legitimate government) use of violence and intimidation as a means to achieve political 
aims (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). Thus, biological terrorism, or more colloquially, 
bioterrorism is the use of an infectious agent, harmful biological, or biochemical agent in 
order to cause violence or intimidation as a means of achieving a political aim (Soanes & 
Stevenson, 2005). 
Knowledge 
It has been proposed that knowledge is any piece of information that is justified, 
believed to be true, and simply results due to sense perception (Plato, n.d./1986). 
Conceptually, it is best defined as information and skills attained through education, 
experience, theoretical, and/or practical understandings of a given subject. It is also 
defined as the sum of what is known on a topic (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). For the 
purpose of this study, knowledge of bioterrorism was defined as the sum of information 
that a clinician understands on the topic of health care management of bioterrorism 
victims including isolation, decontamination, and personal protection. 
36 
Awareness of threat 
There is no definite conceptual definition of the concept "awareness of threat." 
However, given that the legal meaning of a threat is defined as something that could 
cause bodily harm and thus limit personal or societal freedom of action (Soanes & 
Stevenson, 2005), awareness of threat could be defined as the perception of an individual 
or a society of the likelihood that a potentially harmful threat is real. 
Operational Definitions and Instrumentation 
No instrument that operationalizes preparedness as measured through awareness 
of threat and knowledge pertaining to biological terrorism among ED clinicians could be 
found in the literature. Thus, the Bioterrorism Assessment Tool (BAT) was specifically 
developed for the purpose of this study to provide a measurement tool of these two 
concepts. The BAT is composed of three sections that solicits information about the 
demographic characteristics of participants, their awareness of threat, and their 
knowledge with respect to the health management of biological terrorism victims (see the 
Appendix). 
The demographics section of the BAT identifies the participants' profession, 
highest level of schooling, age, gender, certification, if the participant has worked in an 
American ED in the past five years, and years of professional and ED experience. The 
demographic section also contains three questions that solicit information pertaining to 
the amount, nature of training received in the area of health management of biological 
terrorism, and the clinician access to just-in-time information on the topic of bioterrorism 
while working in the ED. 
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The awareness of threat section contains six questions that explore the clinicians' 
awareness of the threat of bioterrorism. The first two questions of this section use a 
Likert-type scale to explore the feeling the clinician has with respect to the probability of 
a biological terrorism attack occurring somewhere in Canada, or in their city over the 
period of the next 10 years. This is followed by two additional Likert-type questions that 
explore participants' perceptions of the level of preparedness they and their ED have to 
respond to a biological terrorism incident. The remaining two questions of this section 
examine the awareness/recollection that participants may have about biological terrorism 
threats or attacks that have occurred in the past 35 years and the awareness of the 
biological agents that may be used in bioterrorist attacks. These last two questions 
provide participants with a list of 10 options, from which only five are correct. Each 
response was awarded one point for each correct answer or one negative point for each 
incorrect answer. Thus, the scores on these two questions may range from negative five 
(the lowest possible score) to positive five (the highest possible score). The awareness 
scale was not treated as a psychometric scale. Instead, each of the six items on this 
section was treated as unique units of analysis (that is, a single item measure). 
The third section of the BAT provides a psychometric tool to measure the 
knowledge of the participants with regard to biological terrorism. It focuses more 
specifically on knowledge related to areas of decontamination, isolation, and personal 
protection that clinicians are anticipated to possess with respect to the health management 
of a biological terrorism event. Knowledge pertaining to these areas is assessed through 
the use of four scenarios that present different possible biological terrorism events (mail 
attack, protest attack, explosive attack, and clandestine discovery), each with a different 
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biological agent, (Ebola, ricin, or unknown agents) and different methods of presentation 
to the ED (surprise arrival with no decontamination, decontaminated at the scene, mass 
casualty event with contaminated, seriously injured patients, and presentation after a low 
probability of exposure, sometime after the event, with self decontamination). At the end 
of each scenario, a question examines the patient decontamination requirements, isolation 
requirements, and the staff personal protection requirements that are appropriate for the 
situation. The situations were scored with one point for a correct answer and negative one 
point for an incorrect answer. The highest possible score on knowledge is 12 and the 
lowest possible score is - 12. Given that the questionnaire has not been validated in 
previous research, it was explored for psychometric properties through testing of its 
validity and reliability. 
Content validity of the BAT was established through the use of a content validity 
index (CVI) as discussed by Burns and Grove (2005). The BAT was sent to four experts 
in emergency medicine, infectious diseases, and/or the medical aspects of biological 
defence. These experts all possessed an undergraduate degree in medicine and were 
employed by the Ministry of National Defence. All four experts had significant training 
in the medical aspects of biological agent defence and three of the four possessed 
graduate level schooling in the form of a Doctor of Philosophy (two) or a Master of 
Health Science degree (one). The one expert without postgraduate schooling is currently 
working full-time in the field of bioterrorism preparedness and has graduated from the 
Medical Management of Biological Casualties course that is offered by the United States 
Army Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. The BAT was sent to the experts for 
evaluation during the first week of August 2007. Respondents were asked to rate the 
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validity (on a four-point scale) of each item to the concept of interest (Lynn, 1986). Space 
was left for open comments to be entered if the respondent wished to do so. Results from 
all four respondents were grouped into two categories; the item is either irrelevant to the 
concept or relevant to the concept. Of the 18-items, the CVI was calculated to be 1.00, 
indicating a 100% agreement among all experts that all items were relevant to the concept 
being measured. No comments reflecting concerns regarding any item were recorded and 
the BAT was not modified prior to data collection. 
Following the completion of data collection, reliability and construct validity of 
the awareness part and the knowledge part of the BAT was examined using Cronbach's 
alpha and exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis) techniques. The 
awareness of the threat part of the BAT consisted of four items yielding a Cronbach's 
alpha of .619. Factor analysis of these items produced a multidimensional scale with two 
distinct factors using a varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization (thus preventing the 
covariance of factors) (Table 1). The first factor identified was external awareness with a 
Cronbach's alpha of .871. This included the items "Probability of an Attack in Canada in 
the next 10 Years" and "Probability of an Attack in their City in the next 10 Years." The 
second factor identified was internal awareness with a Cronbach's alpha of .687. This 
factor was composed of the items "Personal Preparedness for Bioterrorism" and "ED 
Preparedness for Bioterrorism." 
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Table 1 Factor Loadings of the Awareness Scale 
Variable Not Rotated Rotated 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
PACA10A .850 -.408 .940 .061 
PACI10A .845 -.407 .936 .059 
PPBT .551 .676 .149 .860 
EDPBT .405 .785 -.032 .882 
PACA10A = Probability of an attack on Canada in the next 10 years. 
PACI10A = Probability of an attack of their city in the next 10 years. 
PPBT = Personal preparedness for bioterrorism. 
EDPBT = ED preparedness for bioterrorism. 
The internal consistency reliability of the original 12-item knowledge part of the 
BAT was poor, as indicated by a Cronbach's alpha of .353. Using squared multiple 
correlations, item correlations, and item deletion; poor items were successively deleted 
from the instrument. The process of item deletion was halted when it was apparent that 
further deletion would not improve Cronbach's alpha. As a result eight items remained, 
on which factor analysis (principal component analysis) was performed using varimax 
rotation with Kaiser normalization to examine the validity of the remaining set of items. 
The remaining eight items included all of the questions from scenario two and four as 
well as question on isolation and PPE from scenario number three. The analysis revealed 
that although items could load to form a multidimensional scale (three dimensions), the 
item loadings were not theoretically meaningful. Thus, all eight items were allowed to 
load on one factor that accounted for 58.91% of the cumulative variance in knowledge. A 
final Cronbach's alpha of .639 was achieved for the final 8-item knowledge scale. This 
acceptable but modest value warrants further investigation of the knowledge scale. 
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Protection of Human Subjects 
This research conformed to the Government of Canada Tri-Council policy on the 
ethical conduct of research involving humans (Interagency Secretariat on Research 
Ethics, 2005). Approval was requested and granted from the research ethics boards of the 
University of Windsor and two hospital sites where data collection occurred. Participants 
were invited to provide a free and informed consent in written form prior to the 
commencement of data collection. Participants were informed that their decision on 
whether or not to participate in the study would not affect their student/employment 
status, or any business that they may have or intend to have with the University of 
Windsor. All individuals who met the inclusion criteria were invited to participate. To 
ensure that all responses were anonymous no participants' identifying information was 
placed on the survey. In order to protect the privacy of responses, participants were 
advised to insert their completed surveys into a sealed envelope before dropping them 
into the data collection box. The investigator was the sole person responsible for 
collecting all completed surveys from the data collection box. Completed surveys were 
secured in a locked container to which access was limited to the investigator. Data entry 
into a computerized database was performed by the investigator who stored all data in a 
password-protected computer. No respondent identifiers were used in the computerized 
database. All data will be destroyed after five years of the study completion (American 
Psychological Association, 2001). Although the Ministry of National Defence, as part of 
the Canadian Forces Post Graduate Training Plan is funding this study, no conflict of 
interest exists for the researcher. 
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Data Collection 
Data collection commenced on September 3, 2007 upon ethics clearance from the 
various research ethics boards and was completed on October 17, 2007. The investigator 
visited the recruitment sites (the two EDs and the fourth year nursing classes) and 
explained the study to potential participants. In addition to the verbal and written 
explanations that were provided to those present during the investigator's visits, written 
descriptions of the study and the role of participants were left (for example in the mailbox 
of staff) for those who were not present during these visits. A follow up visit was made 
on a weekly basis to ensure all staff members were aware of the research project and had 
surveys at their disposal for completion. Upon their consent to participate in the study, 
the investigator provided the participants with the questionnaire and provided them with 
verbal instructions concerning the completion of the survey. In order to ensure the quality 
of data collection and avoid confusion, the investigator provided participants with the 
opportunity to ask questions or provide comments pertaining to the survey after the 
completion of the verbal explanation. Participants were given a choice to complete the 
survey on site or take it away and complete at the time and location of their convenience. 
Participants were instructed to drop the completed surveys in a secure data collection box 
that was available at each of the sites, or to return the survey to the investigator with the 
attached preaddressed stamped envelope. The completion time for the survey was 
approximately 20 minutes. 
The return rate was relatively high with a total of 165 (86%) returned surveys. 
This included 100% of students (n = 73), 80.6% of nurses (n = 75), and 77.3% of 
physicians (n = 17). With a fixed population of fourth year students and registered nurses 
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working in the EDs, the population captured by the survey could be calculated for these 
two groups. This survey captured 34.1% of the students and 61.5% of the registered 
nurses in the geographical area of interest. The physicians' recruitment rate could not be 
calculated because the number of physicians, working on locum or as residents in the 
EDs, was unknown during the data collection period. 
Data Analysis 
SPSS 15.0 for Windows statistical software package was used to analyze the data. 
Data analysis procedures included data screening, basic descriptive statistics, univariate 
analysis (analysis of variance and Pearson's correlations), and multiple linear regression 
analysis. After completion of all data entry, 30 completed surveys were randomly 
selected and reviewed for the accuracy of the data input into the SPSS database. No 
errors were found. The database was also examined for out-of-range values and outliers 
due to possible errors in data entry. Once again, no such errors were found. 
Data Screening 
Data screening involved searching for and managing any missing values, outliers, and 
multicollinear variables. A check for violations of the statistical assumptions of normality 
was performed amongst the continuous variables (El-Masri & Fox-Wasylyshyn, 2005; 
Munro, 2005). 
Upon examination of the database for missing data, there were 14 variables with 
missing data (Table 2). Several authors suggest that when the amount of missing data are 
small (less than 10%), the variable should be retained for analysis as deletion techniques 
can introduce bias and/or result in larger standard errors due to the overall decrease in 
sample size (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; El-Masri & Fox-Wasylyshyn, 2005; Patrician, 
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2002). Other authors have suggested that variables with 40% or more missing data should 
be deleted (Raymond & Roberts, 1987). Therefore, given that the greatest amount of 
missing data in this study was 11.5% (for the age variable), all data were retained for 
analysis. 
Table 2 




Level of Schooling 
Years in Profession 
Years in Emergency 
Working in USA 
Personal Preparedness 
ED Preparedness 
Scenario #1 -Decontamination 
Scenario #1 -Isolation 
Scenario #1 -PPE 
Scenario #2 - Decontamination 
Scenario #3 - Decontamination 















































When the amount of data missing is small, and random in pattern it is feasible to use 
almost any technique for handling missing data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Group 
mean substitution was used to process the missing data. This technique is based on the 
concept of within-group homogeneity and is thought to provide a more accurate estimate 
of the actual data value than sample mean substitution due to the fact it minimizes the 
risk of attenuation of the between-group variances that occurs the sample is examined as 
a whole (Acock, 1997; El-Masri & Fox-Wasylyshyn, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Univariate normality was assessed by examining the distribution of the continuous 
variables for outliers, skewness, and kurtosis (Munro, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
Outliers were examined through the use of variable box plots and z scores. A z score 
value of more than ± 3.29 was considered an outlier (Field, 2005). Outliers were initially 
found in six of the continuous variables (Table 3). With very few outliers per variable, 
outlier values were Winsorized by assigning them the next closest value (Cohen, 1996). 
Table 3 
Outliers 




1.2% - 2 & 3 
0.6% -3 
0.6% 6 
Yrs in ED 
Total # hours trg (training) 


















Skewness and kurtosis were explored using a ratio technique by dividing the reported 
skewness and kurtosis statistics by the their respective SEs. Some authors (Pert, 1997; 
Stevens, 2002) suggest that the value to determine a departure from normality is ± 1.96, 
while others suggest it is acceptable to use a cut off value between ±2.58 and ± 3.29 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). It as also been suggested in the statistics literature that one 
not need examine the ratio between the given skewness or kurtosis value and the SE, but 
rather look at the overall skewness and kurtosis value to determine a departure from 
normality. Kline (1998) states that the marker for departure from normality would be an 
absolute skewness value greater than 3 and/or an absolute kurtosis value greater than 10. 
Upon initial examination, only the variables of years in profession, history score, and 
agent awareness score exhibited normality (Table 4). Normality could not be achieved 
(using the cut off of ± 3.29) in the total number of training hours, number of training 
hours in the past two years, and knowledge score variables despite an attempt to 
transform the data using base 10 logarithm, natural logarithm, or square roots. However it 
was possible to find normality in the age and years working in ED variables though the 
use of a square root transformation (Table 5). If the Kline (1998) criteria is used all of the 
variables would be considered to be normally distributed as none of the skewness 
statistics are over three and none of the kurtosis statistics are over 10. 
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Table 4 
Initial Evaluation for Normality 
Variable Skewness 
Statistic SE Ratio 
Kurtosis 
Statistic SE Ratio 
Age 
Yrs in profession 
Yrs in ED 
.667 .189 3.53 
.583 .251 2.32 
1.191 .251 4.75 
Total # hours trg (training) 2.348 .189 12.61 
# Hours trg in past 2 yrs 2.352 .189 12.44 
History score -.398 .189 -2.11 
Agent score -.083 .189 -.44 
Knowledge score 1.112 .189 5.88 
-.606 .3 76 -




.437 .376 1.16 
.649 .376 1.73 
1.198 .376 -
Table 5 
Normality after Square Root Transformation 
Variable Skewness 
Statistic SE Ratio 
Kurtosis 
Statistic SE Ratio 
Age 
Yrs in ED 
.494 .189 2.61 
.119 .251 .47 
•1.008 .376 -2.68 
.559 .498 -1.12 
Basic Descriptive and Univariate Statistics 
Basic descriptive statistics including general frequencies of the categorical variables, 
as well as the Mand SD of continuous variables were performed and are reported in 
chapter four. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparisons were performed on 
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independent categorical variables to identify how the knowledge score differs across 
categories o those variables. Pearson's correlations were performed to examine the 
relationship between the continuous independent variables (for example, age) and 
knowledge score. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Prior to regression analysis, variables with more than two categories were dummy 
coded in order to include them in the regression model (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). Independent variables that have ap value of < .25 in the univariate analysis 
were included in the regression analysis. The selection of a liberal p value of < .25 was 
used to avoid the unnecessary deletion of potentially significant independent variables 
from the final multivariate model (Hosmer & Lemshow, 2000). The regression 
model examined the predictors of knowledge pertaining to the health management of a 
bioterrorism attack. An alpha of .05 was used as the criterion to determine a significant 






Tables 6 and 7 display the demographic characteristics of the study participants. 
The results suggest that only 2.7% (n = 2) of registered nurses had advanced certification 
in emergency nursing. Of the physicians, 58.8% (n = 10) had certification in emergency 
medicine and 11.8% (n = 2) had certification in family practice from the Canadian 
College of Family Physicians. No participants had certification in infection control or a 
board specialty from either of the royal colleges. 
Table 6 
Sample Characteristics of Categorical Variables 





High School 37.0% 
College 33.9% 
University 29.1% 


























Sample Characteristics of Continuous Variables 
Total Sample Students Nurses Physicians 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Age 
Years in Prof 
Years in ED 





BT Hrs last 2 Years 2.4 4.5 
22.5 2.6 37.2 7.8 44.3 8.6 
12.3 8.4 17.1 9.7 
7.4 5.9 14.2 8.8 
1.5 3.8 5.5 7.1 11.2 12.9 
1.3 3.6 3.6 5.1 3.1 4.5 
Information Access 
Most participants reported receiving their training in bioterrorism from within the 
hospital setting (32.7%; n = 54), a university or college course (10.9%; n - 18), or from 
reading journals or books (10.9%; n = 18). Participants indicated that in the event of a 
crisis they would seek information from the hospital policy and procedures manual 
(66.7%; n = 110), from the ED manager (51.5%; n = 85), or from the Internet (43.6%; n = 
72). Only 16.4% {n = 12) of students indicated that they received bioterrorism emergency 
training through university or college courses, while 50.7% (n = 38) of registered nurses 
indicated that they received their bioterrorism emergency management training from 
within the hospital. Nursing students indicated that in the event of a crisis, they would 
look for information in the hospital policy manual (68.5%; n = 50), from the ED manager 
(53.5%; n = 39), or on the Internet (52.1%; n = 38). Similarly, registered nurses reported 
that in the event of a crisis they would seek information from hospital policy manual 
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(66.7%; n = 50), from the ED manager (58.7%; n = 44), or from the ED educator (41.3%; 
n = 31). The results suggest that physicians were most likely to have received 
bioterrorism training through a university or college course (29.4%; n = 5), hospital 
setting (29.4%; n = 5), or by attending a conference (29.4%; n = 5). Physicians indicated 
that in the event of a crisis, they would primarily contact the Medical Officer of Health 
for information (76.5%; n = 13), search the Internet (70.6%; n = 12), look it up a textbook 
(64.7%; n = 11), or ask a trusted colleague (64.7%; n = 11). 
Awareness of the Threat of Bioterrorism 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 display the self report data pertaining to the awareness of 
participants of the probability and preparedness for a bioterrorist act, the awareness of 
past bioterrorism events, and the awareness of potential biological agents that may be 
used in terrorist acts. The results suggest that physicians did the best, followed by nurses, 
and nursing students. 
Table 8 
Awareness Probability and Preparedness 
Total Sample Students Nurses 
Probability of an Attack in Canada within the next 10 years 






















Probability of an Attack in their City within the next 10 years 
Not happen 3.0% 2.7% 4.0% 58.8% 
Low 40.6% 42.5% 34.7% 23.5% 
Moderate 38.8% 41.1% 40.0% 11.8% 
High 15.2% 13.7% 17.3% 5.9% 
Will Happen 2.4% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
Personal Preparedness for a Bioterrorism Attack 
Not Prepared 41.6% 46.6% 42.7% 17.6% 
Low 42.4% 46.6% 41.3% 29.4% 
Moderate 15.2% 6.8% 14.3% 52.9% 
High 0.6% 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
Fully Prepared 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
ED Preparedness for a Bioterrorism Attack 
Not Prepared 15.8% 11.0% 21.3% 11.8% 
Low 37.6% 39.7% 36.0% 35.3% 
Moderate 44.2% 49.3% 40.0% 41.2% 
High 1.8% 0.0% 2.7% 5.9% 




Total Sample Students Nurses Physicians 
Oregon Restaurant Attack 
Yes 3.0% 
No 97.0% 
Chicago Water Scare 
Yes 6.1% 
No 93.9% 











































M±SD 1.1 ±1.2 0.6 ±1.0 1.4 ±1.2 2.1 ±1.0 
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Table 10 
Biological Agent Awareness 































































The knowledge score of the entire 12-item questionnaire suggests that physicians 
had the highest level of knowledge (M= -2.0, SD ± 4.6), followed by registered nurses 
(M= -3.0, SD ±3.3), and students (M= -3.9, SD ± 2.7). The overall knowledge score for 
the entire sample was poor (M= -3.3, SD ± 3.2). Descriptive frequencies on data 
pertaining to responses to items on the knowledge scale are provided in Table 11 with the 
correct answer bolded. The Appendix provides explanation of the four knowledge 
scenarios. On the surface the results suggest (without further statistical analysis) that 
physicians have the greatest amount of knowledge with respect to patient isolation and 
personal protection, while nurses have the greatest amount of knowledge with respect to 
decontamination. 
Table 11 
Descriptive Frequencies in the Knowledge Scale 
Total Sample Students Nurses Physicians 


































































Scenario Number Two 
Decontamination 
None 16.4% 


































Standard 14.5% 11.0% 
Airborne 23.6% 23.3% 
Droplet 4.2% 4.1% 
Contact 11.5% 15.1% 
Special 46.1% 46.6% 























































































































































Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
One-way ANOVA tests were completed between the knowledge variable and the 
variables of profession, highest level of schooling completed, gender, certification, and if 
the participant had worked in America in the past five years (Table 12). The knowledge 
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variable used for this analysis was a square root transformation of the raw knowledge 
score to correct for its severe skewness. Table 12 suggests that there was no mean 
difference in the groups across any of the variables. 
Table 12 
ANOVA of Knowledge 
Variable M±SD F ~p 
Profession Z46 X)88 
MD 









.85 ± .74 
.85 ±.74 
.97 ± .74 
1.15 ±.80 
None .95 ± .75 
CCFP(EM) 
CCFP 





Female .95 ± .76 





Worked in USA 3.13 .080 
Yes 1.17 ±.77 
No .85 ± .73 
F = the omnibus F statistic for the one-way ANOVA 
Mean square root of knowledge = .98 ± .76 
Pearson's Correlations 
Two-tailed Pearson's product-moment correlations were completed between the 
square root of the knowledge score and the variables external awareness, internal 
awareness, number of years working in the ED, age, agent score, history score, and the 
number of bioterrorism training hours in the past two years. Table 13 displays the results 
of these correlations and suggests that only external awareness (r = .034; p = .662), years 
of experience in the ED (r = .149;/? = .156), and age (r = .144;/? = .065) were not 
associated with the knowledge score. 
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Table 13 
Pearson's Correlations: Continuous Variables and Knowledge 
Variable M±SD r~ 
External Awareness 
Internal Awareness 




Number of hrs trg in past 2 yrs 2.42 ± 4.15 
r = Pearson's product-moment correlation 























Exploring the multivariate assumptions 
A histogram and a probability plot were created using the square root of the 
knowledge score as the dependent variable and all other variables as independent 
variables into the linear regression model of SPSS. The histogram was examined for the 
frequencies of the regression-standardized residual falling into a normal distribution 
curve (Figure 2). It showed an approximate normal distribution, with no visible 
skewness, leptokurtic, or platykurtic properties, indicating no issues with multivariate 
normality (Corty, 2007). A probability plot was created for the linear fit of plotted 
observed versus expected cumulative probabilities (Figure 3). It showed that the majority 
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of scores fall onto or near the normal distribution line, indicating that multivariate 
linearity is assumed (Field, 2005). 












- 1 0 1 2 3 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Figure 2. Multivariate Normality 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: Square Root of Knowledge 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
Observed Cum Prob 
Figure 3. Multivariate Linearity 
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Both Mahalanobis and Cook's distances were performed to explore multivariate 
outliers. Mahalanobis distance "measures how much the case's values of the independent 
variables differ from the average of all cases. Therefore, a large Mahalanobis distance 
identifies a case as having extreme values on one or more of the independent variables" 
(SPSS, 2005, p.433). The largest Mahalanobis score found was 6.75. Given that the 
critical value of a chi square distribution using 11 degrees of freedom (the number of 
independent variables) and ap value of .001 was 31.6, the calculated Mahalanobis 
distance was not significant, indicating the presence of no multivariate outliers. Cook's 
distance is a measure of the overall influence of all cases on the model. Values of greater 
than one may be a cause for concern (Cook & Weisberg, 1982). Although not required 
due to the nonsignificance of the Mahalanobis distance, examination of the Cook's 
distance revealed no presence of any influential data points (none had a Cook's distance 
of s 1.0). 
Multicollinearity is an undesirable situation that occurs within multiple 
regressions where one or more predictor variables are highly correlated with the other 
predictor variables (Cohen, 1996). Schroeder (1990) suggests a greater than .85 bivariate 
correlation between independent variables creates a situation of multicollinearity. 
Tabachnick and Fidel (2001) provide for a higher bivariate correlation of .90 before 
multicollinearity presents as a statistical problem. Collinearity diagnostic statistics such 
as tolerance, variance inflation factor (VIF), and condition index were examined. VIF 
indicates the strength and the relationship of the independent variables (Field, 2005). 
Myers (1990) and Schroeder (1990) both suggest a VIF of 10 is indicative of 
multicollinearity. The data revealed that the highest VIF was 1.068, indicating no 
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multicollinearity was present. Tolerance is the reciprocal of VIF (1/VIF). Field (2005) 
has indicated values below .1 indicate serious problems, whereas Menard (1995) suggests 
values below .2 may be of concern. The lowest tolerance value was .889, further 
indicating the absence of multicollinearity. Condition index values greater than 10 are 
suggestive of weak dependencies that may start to affect the regression estimates, 
whereas a value of over 100 indicates a serious predicament with respect to 
multicollinearity and the presence of numerical error (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). 
Collinearity diagnostics revealed that the highest condition index was 3.252 and this 
provided another indication of the absence of multicollinearity. 
In addition to multicollinearity testing, Pearson's moment correlation test was 
performed between pairs of continuous variables to examine the possibility of bivariate 
collinearity. The results of these correlations (Table 13) showed no collinearity as 
evidenced by bivariate correlations that were all below 0.8. However, given that "the total 
number of bioterrorism training hours" and "bioterrorism training hours in the past two 
years" have a singular relationship (in that, training hours in the last two years is included 
in the total training hours), the variable "bioterrorism training in the last two years" was 
excluded from the model. 
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Table 14 
Pearson's Correlations: Continuous Variables for Bivariate Collinearity 
Variable I 2 3 4 5 
Internal awareness 1 
External awareness .13 1 
Age (sqrt) 
ED experience 
BT training hours 































(*) Indicates ap value < .05; BT = bioterrorism; ED = Emergency department 
Linear regression analysis 
Prior to performing the linear regression analysis, categorical variables with more 
than three categories (profession and highest level of schooling) were dummy coded. 
Forward stepwise approach was conducted using ap value of .05 as the inclusion criteria 
and .15 as the removal criteria. All variables that had ap value of ^ .25 in the univariate 
analysis were included in the regression model. The results in Table 14 indicate that only 
one variable, the internal awareness score, entered into the model with a R2 of .062. Table 
15 shows the variables that were excluded from the regression model. 
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Table 15 













B = The unstandardized coefficients, fi = The standardized coefficients 
Table 16 









# Hrs Trg last 2 yrs 


















































The overall state of the knowledge of Canadian ED clinicians with respect to 
bioterrorism management is unknown due to the lack of previous studies on this topic. 
With a credible threat to the Canadian population from a bioterrorist attack (Purver, 
1995), a history of terrorists using biological agents to further their cause (USAMRIID, 
2005), and the scientific availability of biological agents for which to use against a 
population (Rotz et al., 2002), ED clinicians could be faced with a sizable situation for 
which previous clinical experience poorly prepares them. With a professional mandate to 
respond to such a crisis, formal preparedness for such an incident is critical. During a 
bioterrorism incident one cannot fall back on past experiential learning acquired from 
incidents to which they have been previously exposed. 
This study explored the awareness (threat, agent, and historical use) and previous 
training ED clinicians had in the field of bioterrorism. Specifically, it explored the core 
competencies of decontamination, personal protection, and isolation, as they are critical 
for the correct ED response to a bioterrorism attack. Fearing that ED clinicians would not 
have all the answers in their memory, the types of immediate references that the clinician 
would utilize to seek just-in-time information were also examined. 
Overall, despite the low levels of formal or informal previous training, the lack of 
historical knowledge of biological agent use, and poor awareness with respect to the type 
of agents that may be employed by terrorist, study participants thought that a bioterrorism 
attack was probable. They reported the notable probability of a bioterrorism attack was 
not only in some distant part of Canada, but also in the city in which they work. 
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Participants were also able to self-articulate the perception of poor personal and moderate 
departmental preparedness for such an incident. This premonition was accurately 
reflected by a lack of knowledge base in the core competencies of decontamination, 
isolation, and personal protection. Upon examination of the factors influencing the 
knowledge of health care providers concerning the management of bioterrorism victims, 
only internal awareness was an independent predictor. That is, the knowledge of the ED 
clinician may have been influenced by how prepared the clinician personally felt and how 
prepared they felt their ED department was to respond to a bioterrorism attack. 
Demographics 
The distribution of the sample in this study was anecdotally similar to the 
distribution of the ED staffing in Canada. The study population was composed of mostly 
female participants and the average experience in emergency care was 8.6 years. RNs in 
the sample were predominantly college educated (62.7%). Of the practicing clinicians, a 
notable number had worked in an American ED (27.2%, n = 25). Surprisingly, the data 
suggested that American work experience did not confer additional training, awareness, 
or knowledge on the topic of bioterrorism, despite the recent (2002-2006) 6.1 billion 
dollar expenditure by the American government to prepare their health care systems for 
disasters such as bioterrorism (GAO, 2007). 
Level of Training 
On average, the data suggest that physicians have twice the bioterrorism 
management training than nurses over the period of their career. Although training was 
found to be higher in this study than that of Ghilarducci et al. (2000), no provincial or 
national standard exists for what constitutes sufficient training. However, the CF nursing 
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occupation provides 55 hours of bioterrorism training at the start of a nursing officers 
career with a yearly (averaging 2.5 hours) refresher for all personnel (MND, 2000). The 
quantity of this training is substantially increased for nursing officers who are expected to 
be prepared to provide care to bioterrorism casualties. This standard is substantially 
higher than the amounts of training reported by participants in this study. 
The state of bioterrorism education within the sampled university nursing 
program was dismal with a total average of 1.5 hours. This lack of bioterrorism education 
finding is congruent with the finding of Markenson et al. (2005), who reported that very 
few American schools provide any formal bioterrorism training within their curricula. 
The importance of training in the fundamentals of emergency bioterrorism care while in 
an undergraduate university program cannot be understated (Langan, Kater, & Aharoni, 
2005), because it provides the foundations for further development and potentially 
comprises a substantial amount of the total training a clinician will ever receive. 
Although training is being conducted within the hospital settings, only one third of 
participants reported receiving such training within the sample studied. 
Access to Information 
The findings suggest that in a crisis situation, information on how to manage the 
bioterrorism emergency would be sought from a variety of sources internal and external 
to the ED. Participants suggested that, within the ED, they are more likely to consult with 
the departmental policy and procedure manual and seek advice on how to manage the 
situation from the ED manager. These two sources for information are within the locus of 
control of the ED and reinforce the importance of having an up to date bioterrorism 
reference within the policy and procedure manual. It also highlights the importance of 
70 
ensuring that key members of the leadership team are knowledgeable in the management 
of a bioterrorism event. The Internet was also identified as a likely tool to which 
participants would turn for information on how to manage the bioterrorism crisis. This 
finding could prove to be problematic because the information contained within the 
Internet is outside the control of the ED management and its content may not always be 
valid. Use of the Internet will force the clinician to be very critical of the information 
found and require scrutinizing for currency, authenticity, and applicability to the 
presenting situation (NATO, 2001; Purcell, 2004). This task could prove to be difficult 
for the clinician, faced with a stressful time sensitive crisis, who is unfamiliar with the 
fundamental concepts of bioterrorism casualty management (Craigie, Loader, Burrows, & 
Muncer, 2002). Having credible websites and resources bookmarked on ED computers 
prior to an emergency can mitigate the hazard the Internet provides as a just-in-time 
reference tool and fosters the rapid access to information (NATO, 2002). 
Threat Awareness 
The findings of this study suggest that almost all ED clinicians and nursing 
students believe there is some probability of encountering a bioterrorism attack within 
Canada in the next 10 years. The threat assessment with respect to probability of 
occurrence within Canada was considerably higher by the participants than that openly 
reported by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Purver, 1995). 
Despite the higher-than-real assessed probability of an attack, participants knew 
little of past historical attacks or biological agents a terrorist may employ against a 
population. The score on historical knowledge was lowest in students and highest in 
physician respondents. Overall, participants were largely unaware of the largest (in terms 
71 
of casualty yield) bioterrorism event (the 1984 Oregon restaurant attack), unaware of the 
first threat of bioterrorism in North America (the 1972 Chicago typhoid water supply 
plan), and unaware of the multiple attempts in the 1990s by the Aum Shinrikyo to attack 
the Japanese population with biological agents. Study participants were largely aware of 
a 2007 bioterrorism scare at a local ED and aware of the postal anthrax attacks that 
affected the United States in 2001. These findings could be reflective of the change in 
global terrorism awareness since 11 September 2001 (Michaels, 2002), where North 
Americans are more concerned over threats and actions that terrorists could take against 
them (Gartenstein-Ross, 2007; Millward, 1993). Another possibility could be attributed 
to the theory of knowledge half-life (Machlup, 1962), which suggests that people are 
more likely to be aware of information to which they have been recently exposed (such as 
in news reports). 
With respect to the knowledge of the biological agents that a terrorist is most 
likely to use, participants once again scored poorly. Students had the lowest score, while 
physicians had the highest score. Of greatest concern was the finding that most 
participants were unaware that Lassa fever may be employed as a bioterrorism agent and 
were unaware that highly infectious tularemia may be used as a weapon. Although the 
awareness results for plague, smallpox, and botulism toxin were better, they were 
disconcertingly low for clinicians responsible for a frontline response. The five agents 
presented in this study comprise 71.4% of all agents considered to be of highest 
likelihood to be used by a terrorist according to the CDC (Rotz et al. 2002). Without the 
ability to know which agents might present in the ED after a bioterrorism attack, ED 
clinicians cannot adequately detect, treat, or protect themselves from the infectious 
72 
process (USAMRIID, 2005). In comparison to Chen et al. (2002) who examined 
American family physicians awareness of bioterrorism agents, the findings of this study 
were similar for tularemia, lower for smallpox, and higher for plague and botulism. 
Knowledge 
Knowledge pertaining to the key concepts of decontamination, personal 
protection, and isolation were examined in this study. In general, the findings suggested 
that knowledge of the participants was very low. The fact that participants not only 
lacked knowledge in many situations, but were likely to select answers that will be of 
counter productive nature was especially concerning. Once again, knowledge was found 
to be lowest in students and highest in physicians, although the overall knowledge of the 
sample was disconcertingly poor, regardless of profession. 
With respect to knowledge of decontamination, the findings were somewhat 
positive. Practicing clinicians articulated the need to decontaminate an obviously 
contaminated casualty. Further, the large majority understood the importance of 
decontaminating all casualties regardless of their injuries prior to admittance into the ED. 
However, it is concerning that a group of physicians and nurses indicated that they would 
admit a casualty requiring urgent medical treatment into the ED prior to decontamination. 
A situation where a contaminated casualty gains admission to the ED prior to 
decontamination is the worse case scenario (Levitin et al., 2003). This action 
compromises the environmental safety of the ED infrastructure (possibly rendering the 
ED closed for several months while structural decontamination is undertaken) and places 
both clinicians and other patients in the ED at considerable risk of acquiring an infectious 
disease (GAO, 2003). Practicing ED clinicians were most likely to over decontaminate 
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casualties (that is, initiating decontamination when not required). While this is preferable 
over under decontamination (that is, not decontaminating a casualty who requires 
decontamination), it still presents problems in the overall management of biologically 
contaminated casualties (Currance, 2005). These problems include a physical and 
psychological risk to staff and patients by working in personal protective equipment 
(NATO, 2004), the disruption of regular ED care, the cost of committing disposable 
resources (United States Department of Justice, 2002), and the image portrayed to the 
media. This study examined two situations where decontamination did not need to occur. 
One was a small group of reliable patients (police officers) who were decontaminated on 
scene by a reliable decontamination system (the fire department hazardous material 
team), while the other was a patient who obviously did not require decontamination due 
to his presenting story and possible agent of exposure. In the first case, very few of the 
respondents would allow the police officers into the ED for medical examination, while 
the majority would force a full second decontamination at the ED. In the second case, 
few participants understood that this patient did not pose a risk to the ED and opted not to 
decontaminate, while the majority would once again force this patient needlessly through 
the decontamination process. 
With respect to the practice of isolation, clinicians understood the importance of 
isolating a bioterrorism casualty who presents with exposure to a potentially highly 
contagious disease (in this case Ebola). Overall, practicing clinicians tended to over 
estimate the need for isolation. The results show a lack of understanding of the facts that 
decontamination most often negates the need for isolation (Veenema, 2007b), that ricin 
exposure is not a condition for which isolation is warranted (USAMRIID, 2005), and that 
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the technique of quarantining patients is not the standard of practice (Hoffman, 2003). 
This lack of knowledge could result in unwarranted commitment of resources (isolation 
rooms) and the potential of needlessly treating (such as in scenario three, see Appendix 
A) casualties with traumatic injuries that need resuscitation in the isolation room. 
Performing trauma resuscitation outside the resuscitation area (where all supplies are 
located, drills are practiced, and space is optimally designed) could result in suboptimal 
care (Huddy, 2002). 
Participants scored the poorest with regard to the personal protection component 
of knowledge. Once again, respondents universally over estimated the requirement for 
PPE. In all but the last scenario, the respondents chose that they would use a "category C 
protective garment" complete with air purifying mask to care for patients within the ED. 
This was the highest level of protection offered and would involve the use of a full-face 
air purifying respirator or powered air purifying respirator, chemical resistant clothing, 
inner gloves, chemical resistant outer gloves taped to the suit, and chemical resistant 
books with a steel toe and shank (Currance & Mailliard, 2005). This robust level of 
protection is usually reserved for decontamination line personnel, especially those 
involved in chemical (versus biological) agent decontamination (Dickens, 2002; 
Veenema, 2007b). Multiple problems exist with over estimating the PPE requirement. 
Physical and psychological performance degradation occurs when staff is burdened by 
such levels of PPE resulting in a net decrease in the ability to provide care (NATO, 2004; 
Veenema, 2007b). It is also possible that receiving care by hospital staff in "space-suits" 
would have an adverse effect on the psychological well-being of the patient (Mason & 
Lyons, 2003). Another issue would arise when staff members are not provided this level 
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of protection (as the hospitals EDs do not have it), despite expectations that they be 
protected in such a manner. Such situation could result in MD/RN refusal to work and 
other human resource issues such as occupational health and safety claims and a stop 
work order by a union (Veenema, 2007b). The issue of desiring a higher level of 
protection for which to provide care is related to the misunderstanding of the 
decontamination process, lack of knowledge that most biological agents are not 
communicable, and the ability of self protection using commonly available infection 
control PPE postures such as airborne, droplet, contact, and standard precautions. 
Predictors of Knowledge 
On examination of the factors associated with the knowledge of health care 
providers in the ED concerning the management of the victims of bioterrorism, only 
internal awareness was an independent predictor. This finding is congruent with that of 
Chen et al. (2002) who reported that bioterrorism preparedness within American family 
physicians was reflective of increased knowledge. This finding reinforces the logic that 
people who think they are prepared are knowledgeable with respect to how to react, and 
those who know they are not prepared most often know they lack knowledge in the given 
area. Nonetheless, it was surprising that none of the other variables examined in the 
model (for example, profession, external awareness, agent awareness, awareness of past 
bioterrorism events, bioterrorism training, and having worked in the USA) were 
significant. 
With respect to training, one would hypothesize, based on the CF NBC 
framework used for this study, that increased training would be an independent predictor 
of knowledge. This hypothesis did not hold true as the minimal amounts of training 
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reported by participants with regard to the fundamentals examined here 
(decontamination, isolation, and personal protection) did not predict knowledge. Further 
examination of this part of the conceptual framework should be conducted to discover if 
this finding is a one-time occurrence or rather is a recurrent in other studies resulting in 
the need for a revision of the framework. 
Implications and Recommendations 
The findings of this study add to the body of knowledge within disaster 
preparedness, medical bioterrorism defence, and emergency nursing/medicine. They are 
particularly relevant to the setting where the data was collected and should not be 
generalized beyond these EDs. The overall low knowledge regarding how to respond to a 
bioterrorism attack serves as a warning to planners, clinicians, policy makers, educators, 
and managers that we are ill prepared to deal with the health consequences of a 
bioterrorism attack. 
Recommendations for Practice 
This study reinforces the need identified by the USPHS (2004) for ED clinicians 
to be competent in the management of bioterrorism casualties. As part of this 
competency, managers must ensure that staff are cognizant of the risk of a bioterrorism 
attack, biological agents that could be potentially used, how to decontaminate casualties 
in a timely manner, and how to protect themselves and others from potentially infectious 
situations. By ensuring that hospitals have knowledgeable teams of ED clinicians that are 
prepared to manage victims of bioterrorism, the preparedness for future naturally caused 
pandemics is simultaneously bolstered. It has been reported by Goldstein (2003) that the 
American investment in biological terrorism preparedness allowed the rapid response to 
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the 2003 SARS epidemic. To this avail, managers should train their staff on the topic of 
bioterrorism, policy makers should fund training and incorporate minimal levels of 
training into policy documents, and ED clinicians should seek out information on the 
topic of bioterrorism in order to provide competent care to potential bioterrorism 
casualties. 
This study also suggests the need for ED managers, ED educators, and the 
Medical Officer of Health to be experts on the topic of the management of bioterrorism 
casualties. According to this study, ED staff will turn to these key players in the event of 
a bioterrorism emergency for direction, advice, and procedural guidance. Given the 
overall low level of knowledge on the subject, if these people are not knowledgeable, not 
only may a leadership crisis ensue (MND, 2007), but the whole ED system may fail. The 
study also suggests the need for the policy and procedure manual within the ED to have 
clear, concise, and accurate guidelines on the management of bioterrorism casualties. 
Recommendations for Teaching 
This study supports the statements by Markenson et al. (2005) and the 
International Nursing Coalition for Mass Casualty Education (2003) on the importance of 
formally educating both nurses and physicians on the topic of bioterrorism. Given that 
low levels of knowledge were reported within all professions in this study, it is evident 
that the educational system is failing health care providers with respect to bioterrorism 
education. All undergraduate medicine and nursing programs need to contain information 
on the threat, historical precedence, and potential biological agents, and management of 
bioterrorism victims. This hazard identification and risk analysis approach to disaster 
management is well supported in the literature (Ciottone, 2006; Coppola, 2007). 
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Subsequent to the understanding of the problems, students should be educated on the 
fundamentals of response such as decontamination, isolation, and personal protection 
from infectious agents. Such fundamental training should be expanded to graduate 
programs, specialty training for ED clinicians, and professional maintenance of 
competency training within the ED settings. 
Recommendations for Research 
Given that this was the first study to examine the knowledge of bioterrorism 
management amongst ED clinicians, the findings need to be replicated before they can be 
generalized. It would be useful to have this study conducted over multiple sites within 
Canada in order to examine regional variance and gain a better understanding of the 
overall preparedness for a bioterrorism attack. It also is recommended that research be 
conducted on how the topics surrounding bioterrorism and infectious diseases are being 
taught within medical and nursing undergraduate programs, and how comfortable new 
graduates feel about applying these skills to practice. Finally, it is recommended that the 
BAT be subjected to further testing to allow for the inclusion of a greater number of 
questions that examine one situation. This would allow for a greater sampling of the 
concepts, prevent one erroneous answer from discounting knowledge on a topic, and 
ideally increase the ability to captures the essence of knowledge on this topic. 
Limitations 
A data collection technique that relies on self-report has the potential for response 
bias (Burns & Grove, 2005). It is possible that respondents, despite being asked not to do 
so in the introductory letter, spoke to their colleagues about the questions or looked up 
the answers prior to submitting their results. Additionally, the study design prevents the 
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declaration of any manner of causality. Although the descriptive methodology used in 
this study served a distinct purpose, the underlying methodology nonetheless remains a 
limitation to the advancement of the science. Future study methodologies should take this 
into account in order to advance the state of knowledge within this topic. 
The BAT was a new research survey created specifically for this research. 
Although great care was taken to psychometrically validate it prior to use, limitations 
may be present in any new tool when it is first used. There is a risk that the BAT did not 
fully capture the maximum level of variance with respect to awareness and knowledge. 
Future mitigation of this risk can come with repeated use of the tool, further 
psychometric validation, and revision if required. 
Conclusion 
The risk of another bioterrorism attack occurring and need for Canadian ED 
clinicians to provide care to those affected is probable. Despite having EDs that are 
centres for excellence for emergency care, the sample was not prepared to deal with the 
casualties that are resultant from a bioterrorist attack. This lack of preparedness is directly 
impacted by the lack of awareness and knowledge among ED clinicians with respect to 
management of bioterrorism casualties. The risk of poorly responding to a bioterrorism 
event is compounded by the fact that education on the topic of bioterrorism casualty 
management does not provide students with the fundamental required knowledge. By 
increasing the level of awareness and knowledge with respect to bioterrorism casualty 
management, we can deter the use of biological agents by terrorists and better serve 
patients who seek assistance after an attack has occurred. 
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APPENDIX: Questionnaire Sample 
Awareness and knowledge of bioterrorism management amongst emergency 
department clinicians: An exploratory descriptive study 
Demographics and Characteristics 
1- Profession 
• MD 
• RN / RN(EC) 
D 4th Year Nursing Student 
2- Highest Level of School COMPLETED 
• High School 
• College 
• University ^ ^ ^ 
3- Gender 
• Female • Male 
4- What is your age in years? 
5- Certification (if any) 
• FRCPC / FRCSC D CCFP(EM) • CCFP • ENC(C) / CEN • CIC 
Nursing Students, please skip to question # 9 
6- How many years have you been practicing in your profession? 
years 
7- How many years have you been practicing in the field of emergency medicine / nursing? 
years 
8- Have you worked full or part time in an American hospital in the past 5 years? 
• No • Yes 
9- Estimate the total number of hours of education and/or training you have received in the area 
of biological terrorism. Estimated number of hours: 
10- Estimate the number of hours of education and/or training you have had in the past 2 years in 
the area of biological terrorism. hours 
11-1 have received training in biological terrorism from (check all that apply): 
D University / College courses • Government courses 
• Internet courses • Conferences 
• In-hospital training • Journals / Books 
• Internet reading • Other, please specify: 
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12- If you required information while managing a biological terrorism situation in the emergency 
department, you would look (check all that apply): 
• In a textbook 
• In the policy and procedures manual 
• On the Internet 
• On your PDA 
• you would telephone a colleague whom you trust 
• You would telephone the emergency nurse educator 
• You would telephone the emergency department manager 
• You would phone the infectious diseases physician on call 
• You would phone the Medical Officer of Health at the Health Unit 
• Other 
Bioterrorism Assessment Tool - Part I 
Awareness of the Threat of Bioterrorism 
1-1 feel the probability that Canada will be affected by a biological terrorism incident in the next 
10 years is: 
• It will not happen • Low • Moderate • High • Certain it will happen 
2-1 feel the probability of my city being affected by a biological terrorism incident in the next 10 
years is: 
• It will not happen • Low • Moderate • High • Certain it will happen 
3- The level of preparedness I have to respond to a biological terrorism incident is: 
• Not prepared • Low • Moderate • High • Fully Prepared 
4- The level of preparedness my emergency department has to respond to a biological terrorism 
incident is: 
• Not prepared D Low • Moderate • High D Fully Prepared 
5- Please identify all of the following actual or threatened incidents of bioterrorism that you are 
aware of (check all that apply): 
• Chicago (O'Hare) Airport find 
• Toronto Chinatown laboratory find 
• Oregon restaurant attack 
• Chicago city water attack plan 
D Japanese cult (Aum Shinrikyo) attacks 
• Sydney Olympic Games scare 
• Hotel-Dieu ED envelope scare 
• Ottawa Canada Day incident 
• American postal mail attacks 
• New York supermarket attack plan 
6- Please identify all of the following diseases that pose a HIGH threat of use as a biological 
terrorism agent (check all that apply): 
• Dengue • 
• Human immunodeficiency virus • 
• Smallpox • 
D Lassa Fever • 







Bioterrorism Assessment Tool - Part II 
Knowledge of Bioterrorism Emergency Care 
Number 1: 
A senior federal government official in a local office opened a package at his desk. Inside this package 
was an unknown quantity of a fine white powder. A letter inside the package indicated this powder was 
Ebola, and the person who opened the package was going to die. The official reports to your emergency 
department (by car) in a panic. 
Please select the BEST answer for the following questions: 
Which (one) of the following statements is true regarding removal of the agent from this person? 
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the alleged biological agent is not on the person. 
• Removal of clothes as soon as possible after entering the emergency department. 
• A shower with hot water and soap in the emergency department. 
D A full decontamination outside of the emergency department. 
After the response taken above, this patient should be initially triaged into what area? 
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization. 
• The waiting room, as the patient is not ill and not at risk of spreading the disease. 
• The isolation room, as the patient could be contagious. 
• Another area within the emergency department for further evaluation. 
What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for this patient in the 
emergency department? 
• Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate). 
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection). 
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient). 
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns). 
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C). 
protective garment 
Number 2 
A global trade organization meeting is taking place in your city. This activity has resulted in large 
protests. During one of these protests a group of four police officers are sprayed with an unknown liquid. 
Fearing it may be chemical or biological in nature they remove themselves from the containment line 
and are decontaminated by the on-site hazardous materials team. Despite being asymptomatic, as part of 
the police protocol they are brought to your facility (with notice of arrival) for examination, 
documentation, and treatment. 
Please select the best answer for the following questions: 
These police officers require: 
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the hazardous materials team did it. 
• Removal of clothes as soon as possible after entering the emergency department. 
• A shower with hot water and soap in the emergency department. 
D A full decontamination outside of the emergency department. 
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After the response taken above, these patients should be triaged into what area? 
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization. 
• The outside, pending the evaluation by a biological detector to confirm they are clean of agent. 
• Into one isolation room, as the patients could be contagious from biological agent exposure. 
• Another area within the emergency department for further evaluation. 
What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for these patients in the 
emergency department? 
• Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate). 
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection). 
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient). 
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns). 
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C 
protective garment). 
Number 3 
A parade is occurring downtown in celebration of an important event. Despite some of the controversy 
over this event a large crowd turns out on this sunny day in order to celebrate. There is an explosion and 
many people in the crowd are injured from the blast. For reasons not totally clear, the on-site emergency 
services commander feels this might be a conventional bombing with a chemical or biological agent 
release occurring at the same time. He activates the city emergency plan, and your emergency 
department is notified that decontamination operations are being set up on scene and casualties will be 
sent to your department. Five minutes later, people start arriving by taxi and personal car at your front 
door. Some of them look quite injured and are in physical distress. 
Please select the best answer for the following questions: 
These people require: 
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the hazardous materials team is on the scene, and is in 
control of decontamination operation for this situation. 
• No decontamination, as the likelihood of biological contamination is non-existent. 
• No decontamination for the urgent / emergent casualties, as they cannot wait. All others will 
have their clothes removed and have a hot, soapy shower. 
• A full decontamination outside of the emergency department for all casualties, regardless of the 
nature of their injuries. 
After the response taken above, the patients with serious trauma should be triaged into what area: 
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization. 
• The outside, due to the possibility of biological off-gassing through the wounds. 
• Into one isolation room, as the patients could be contagious from biological agent exposure. 
• Another area within the hospital which will be designated a "quarantined area". 
PLEASE CHECK THAT ALL ITEMS YOU WISH TO FILL IN ARE COMPLETE 
AND THEN TURN THE PAGE 
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What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for these patients in the 
emergency department? 
• Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate). 
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection). 
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient). 
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns). 
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C) 
protective garment. 
Number 4 
A Canadian Border Security Agency Customs Officer arrives at your triage desk. He informs you that he 
fells "unwell" with general malaise, nausea, and a headache. He notes his illness began sometime after 
his shift at the border. He noted that during work today he was in contact with an unknown brown 
powder in a shipment he was inspecting. Not thinking anything of it at the time, the shipment was 
cleared to pass into Canada. When he mentioned this to his wife (who is a biologist) she was concerned 
that he may have come into contact with Ricin (a biological agent), and this might be the cause of his 
presenting illness. When questioned about his activities after work he informs you he has changed his 
clothes, had a shower, ate dinner, and had a nap before coming to the emergency department. 
Please select the best answer for the following questions: 
This gentleman requires: 
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the possible exposure took place 12 hours ago and 
he has since changed and showered at home. 
D Removal of clothes as soon as possible upon entering the emergency department. 
• A shower with hot water and soap in the emergency department. 
• A full decontamination outside of the emergency department. 
After the response taken above, this person should be triaged into what area? 
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization. 
• The outside, due to the possibility of Ricin off-gassing through the respiratory system. 
• The isolation room, as the patient could be contagious from biological agent exposure. 
• Another area within the emergency department for further evaluation. 
What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for this patient in the 
emergency department? 
D Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate). 
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection). 
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